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Abstract
Securing ad hoc networks represents a challenging issue, related to their very characteristics of decentralized
architecture, low-complexity, and multiple hops communications. Even if several methods are available, this paper
presents a novel approach to allow secret sharing of information at lower levels of the node protocol stack. In
fact, secret sharing schemes provide a natural way of addressing security issues in ad hoc networks. To this aim,
a flexible framework for secure end-to-end transmission of confidential information is proposed which exploits
multipath source routing and hierarchical shares distribution. Such a goal is achieved by designing an ideal, perfect,
and eventually verifiable secret sharing scheme based on Birkhoff polynomial interpolation and by establishing
suitable hierarchies among independent paths.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, ad hoc networks represent a relevant research topic in the field of telecommunication networks. In
an ad hoc network wireless hosts communicate with each other in the absence of a fixed infrastructure. They
can be used in several applications, ranging from tactical operations, to establish quickly military communications
during the deployment of forces in unknown and hostile terrain, to rescue missions, for communication in areas
without adequate wireless coverage; from exhibitions or conferences or virtual classrooms, to sensor networks,
for communication between intelligent sensors. A wireless ad hoc network presents a larger spectrum of security
problems than conventional wired and wireless networks, due to the broadcast nature of the transmission medium
and vulnerability because nodes are often placed in a hostile or dangerous environment where they are not physically
protected. As in any wireless environment, the nodes are easy to capture, compromise and hijack. An attacker can
listen to and modify all the traffic on the wireless communication channel, and may attempt to masquerade as one
of the participants. Due to the absence of any central support infrastructure, authentication based on public key
cryptography and certification authorities may be difficult to accomplish.
There has been a flurry of research and development effort in the field of security in ad hoc networks, but
results are still incomplete. Due to the severe hardware and energy constraints, selecting appropriate cryptographic
primitives and security protocols in ad hoc networks is a problematic point. A usual approach for keeping sensitive
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2data secret is to encrypt the data with a secret key known also by the receiver, ensuring in this way confidentiality.
As already said, the general energy contraint in these networks creates limits also for security, due to consumption of
processor power. Moreover, in asymmetric cryptographic algorithms (used for example in Encapsulating Security
Payload to provide confidentiality in IPSec ([1])) the length of keys which provide security is often too high
for node’s working memory. To achieve confidentiality means to prevent intermediate or non-trusted nodes from
understanding the contents of packets. A lot of protocols offer solutions using cryptographic algorithms (see [2],
[3], [4]).
The idea of the paper is to exploit the specific characteristics of an ad hoc network (multihop data delivery,
absence of fixed infrastructure, decentralized architecture) in order to enforce security at the lower levels of the
protocol stack (i.e., MAC layer). In particular, we propose a method to achieve end-to-end data protection against
passive attacks in ad hoc networks where the nodes are not highly mobile. We focus on a method which permits to
achieve confidentiality exploiting multiple paths between source and destination and taking into account different
characteristics of the paths. As a consequence, the next paragraphs are focused on secret sharing schemes. A
method which exploits multiple paths avoiding message retransmission is to transmit redundant information through
additional routes for error detection and correction [5]: part of the disjoint routes are used to transmit data and
part for redundant information. In such a way if certain routes are compromised, the receiver is able to recover the
message. In our method the transmission exploits multiple paths but improving the concept of redundant information.
In the previous example confidentiality can be achieved only by adding encryption. We pretend to avoid the use
of cryptographic algorithms for the already mentioned reasons. The key point of our scheme is that a non-trusted
node intercepting a packet gets no information about the transmitted data. This is achieved with a secret sharing
scheme. In [5], the usage of threshold schemes for key management is proposed. The same principle together with
multipath routing is exploited, also in the case of data transmission, in [6]. A   threshold sharing scheme
allows to divide a confidential message into  shares and requires the knowledge of at least  out of  shares to
reconstruct the original content. Each share does not carry any meaningful partial plaintext of the original message
and, if the number of shares available is less than  , a potential attacker can do no better than guessing, even with
infinite computing time and power. The basic scheme, due to Shamir ([7]), relies on standard Lagrange polynomial
interpolation and introduces a hierarchical approach by simply assigning a higher number of shares to higher level
(more important, or reliable) participants. More recently, a refined hierarchical scheme was obtained by Tassa ([8])
from subtler properties of Birkhoff polynomial interpolation.
In order to exploit different characteristics of paths and in particular different trust levels, it is natural to apply
a hierarchical model. For instance, the protocol SAR (Security Aware Ad Hoc Routing) proposes the Quality
of Protection bit vector to classify routes [3]. Even though a hierarchical secret sharing scheme seems to be
suitable also for an ad hoc network, nevertheless the previous approaches suffer from severe constraints for practical
implementation. Namely, efficiency of Shamir’s proposal is compromised by the systematical delay due to multiple
assignments. On the other hand, Tassa’s algorithm works only on large finite fields (see [8], Theorem 4), making
it unsuitable for an ad hoc node with limited computational resources.
In order to overcome such difficulties, the present paper introduces an alternative scheme for secure information
sharing in ad hoc networks applications. As in Tassa’s approach, Birkhoff interpolation theory is applied, but with
some crucial improvements. In particular, random allocation of participants enables to exploit stronger mathematical
tools and drastically reduce the size of the base field. Furthermore, each participant receives only one share
3(overcoming the main drawback of Shamir’s hierarchical scheme) and the secret is identified with a sequence
of elements of the field (reflecting the natural structure of a message as a sequence of packets). As a consequence,
both the delay and the overhead are significantly reduced.
The structure of the paper is the following. In Section II, after recalling the definition of hierarchical secret
sharing, the proposed sharing scheme is introduced and a mathematical proof that it is ideal, perfect, and eventually
verifiable is given. In Sections III and IV, a hierarchical multipath framework for ad hoc networks is described,
providing both a general scheme and a sample application scenario. Finally, in Section V, some concluding remarks
and outlines about future work on the topic are presented.
II. DESCRIPTION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED ALGORITHM
The basic scheme proposed by Shamir [7] relies on standard Lagrange polynomial interpolation. To be explicit,
Shamir’s idea is simply to identify a secret   with some coefficient of a polynomial
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is a so-called Vandermonde matrix. It follows that the linear system (1) admits a unique solution if and only if
687
 . In particular, at least  out of  shares are needed to reconstruct   , hence we obtain a   secret sharing
scheme.
As pointed out by Shamir himself in [7], a hierarchical variant can be introduced by simply assigning a higher
number of shares to higher level participants. More recently, a refined hierarchical scheme was obtained by Tassa
[8] from subtler properties of Birkhoff polynomial interpolation.
Let 9 be a given set of  participants and fix a collection : of subsets of 9 , which is monotone in the sense
that if ;<=: then any set containing ; also belongs to : . A threshold secret sharing scheme with access structure
: is a method of sharing a secret among the members of 9 , in such a way that only subsets in : can recover the
secret, while all other subsets have no information about it. Assume that 9 is divided into levels, i.e. 9>@?A
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9
A
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where 	 states cardinality.
Roughly speaking, a subset of participants can reconstruct the secret if and only if it contains at least   members
of level I , at least    members of level I or level % , at least   members from levels I , % , and  , and so on.
In order to construct a suitable       
? 
 hierarchical threshold secret sharing scheme, it is natural to apply
Birkhoff interpolation instead of Lagrange interpolation. The key point is that the Birkhoff scheme involves not only
a polynomial, but also its (higher order) derivatives. To be formal, as in [11], p. 124, let    


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  of   ﬂ  . However, it is easy to convince ourselves that a Birkhoff interpolation problem
can admit infinitely many solutions even if the number of equations equals the number of unknowns. Indeed, think
for a moment at the case in which 



 I for every '  %   . In such a case, the interpolation system involves
only derivatives of the polynomial  , hence it keeps no track of the constant term

 , which remains undetermined.
More generally, elementary linear algebra considerations show that if a Birkhoff interpolation problem admits a
unique solution then its associated interpolation matrix    
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(see for instance p. 126 of [11]).
The idea now is to exploit this necessary condition in order to ensure that only authorized subsets can reconstruct
the secret. Intuitively speaking, an evaluation of the polynomial itself carries more informations than an evaluation
of any of its derivatives since it involves more coefficients; therefore it sounds reasonable to assign to a participant
of higher level the evaluation of a lower order derivative.
For shares generation, we propose the following algorithm:
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5We stress that for 4 I our scheme is ideal, i.e. the size of the shares is equal to the size of the secret; if 4 7 %
the information rate is even higher. We also point out that the above scheme becomes verifiable after the following
additional procedure, inspired by [9]. The dealer selects an appropriate elliptic curve  over the field . in such
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In order to reconstruct the secret   , the combiner has to solve the following linear system:
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It is easy to check by direct inspection that

D: if and only if ﬂ	 satisfies the Po´lya condition. In particular,
we deduce the following:
Theorem 1. If ﬃ=: then  !#"   	  is identically I , hence  cannot reconstruct the secret.
Next we introduce some standard terminology. A shift $ of  is a translation of a one from a place   '  ﬁ  into
the place   '  ﬁ + %  , assuming that this is possible, i.e. ﬁ +% (  and that 
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new matrix $    . We say that two rows of  have a collision if they have ones in the same column.
Define ' to be the minimum number of shifts $    ($*) such that $*)+,$*)    + -+,$      has no collisions in
rows % and  . With this notation we have the following:
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Proof: The case of characteristic I is Theorem 10.1 in [11]. In the other case, following verbatim the same
proof we obtain (see equation (10.4)):
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identically I for every : &C'7  In order to prove that this last inequality always holds, we may argue by induction
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In order to apply the above general results in our context, first of all notice that 
	
satisfies Po´lya condition
if and only if

D: (essentially by definition). As a consequence, we can prove that a subset of participants can
reconstruct the secret if and only if it belongs to the access structure. In particular, for 4  I our scheme is perfect.
Theorem 2. In the notation above, if  =: then  !#"   	   >9    9 
  G I , hence  can reconstruct the secret.
Proof: If 	 I , then our scheme reduces to Shamir’s one ([7]) and there is nothing to prove. If instead  7 % ,
up to reordering the rows of  	 we can assume that there are no collisions in rows % and  , hence we have '  I .
By Lemma 1,  !#"  
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III. HIERARCHICAL SECRET SHARING IN AD HOC NETWORKS
In an ad hoc network end-to-end security is a major issue. Indeed, we can assume that neighboring nodes can
easily exchange security keys, in order to establish an authenticated and secure channel on a link basis (a usual
assumption in this situation, see for instance [14] and [6]). Therefore, the problem to solve is related to grant secure
transmissions on an end-to-end basis. Our approach aims at exploiting multiple independent paths from source to
destination in such a way to spread along the ad hoc network the secret information. Depending on various factors,
paths can be classified into several levels and identifying a suitable hierarchy of disjoint routes allows to apply the
hierarchical secret sharing scheme presented in Section II in order to enforce security. However, the selection of
a path hierarchy is a non trivial task in an ad hoc network. In the next paragraphs a general model is proposed,
which is based on both global and local properties of the paths.
Let us identify a path from a source (dealer) - to a destination (combiner) $ as an ordered sequence of nodes
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. As it is well known, the problem of finding a maximum cardinality
7set of node disjoint paths in a network (thought as a digraph) can be solved in polynomial time (see for instance [13],
Proposition 2.4 (i)). Choose a maximum cardinality set 9 of independent paths (or more generally any sufficiently
big subset) and fix    	 9 .
We can assume that neighboring nodes can easily exchange security keys, in order to establish an authenticated
and secure channel on a link basis (a usual assumption in this situation, see for instance [14] and [6]). Therefore,
the problem to solve is related to grant secure transmissions on an end-to-end basis.
Let     x  be the packet loss probability of the path x. Its value depends on several properties of the path (for
instance, signal-to-noise ratio, number of hops, interference, etc.).
It is possible to define 	
    x  as the probability for a packet travelling on x to be eavesdropped. As a function
of x, 
  can be expressed as the algebraic sum of several contributions of different nature:
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   x  &% . The term ﬃ includes the potential flaws related to the whole path,
such as the total number of hops, while  ﬃ takes into account security robustness of each node, such as terminal’s
reliability, tamper resistant harware equippment, user’s trustworthiness. It is clear that the functionals  ﬃ contribute
to 
  with positive sign (in particular, if the number of hops is higher, then a path is more likely to be subject
to external attacks), while the functionals  ﬃ are considered with the opposite sign.
The set of values assumed by 
  induces a natural hierarchy on the set of paths. Namely, if 	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Finally, we have to determine a strictly increasing sequence of thresholds 
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produce a safer scheme; on the other hand, by definition, in order to recover the secret, the receiver needs at
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Summarizing, the proposed scheme can be implemented as follows:
Source
-
:
1) finds a set 9 of node disjoint paths to destination $ with a multipath routing process (see for instance [15]
and [16]) and for each x  9 collects all relevant properties of x (signal-to-noise ratio, number of hops,
interference, terminal’s reliability, user’s trustworthiness...);
2) computes     x  and 	
    x  for every path x  9 ;
3) defines      
? 
 with 

as in (4) and    	<9 ;
4) selects a finite field . with characteristic  7 
?
and cardinality / 7
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6) identifies each path x  9 A with a random element 9  . and associates to 9 the share   
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7) transmits every share along an independent path through source routing, exploiting private communication
between neighbouring nodes (as in [14], [6], it is possible to assume that neighbouring nodes in an ad hoc
network can exchange encryption keys during link initialization in order to establish an authenticated channel
on the physical link).
Destination $ :
1) receives  &  shares, say from the subset of paths

   9
 
 9ﬃﬁ
# 
9 ;
2) constructs the matrix  	 as in (2);
3) recovers the secret by solving the linear system (3) in the indeterminates


 



 
.
Collection of info
about disjoint paths 
and definition of the
thresholds
Insertion of the
derivatives
and computation of its
secret into a polynomial Evaluation on randompoints assigned to
each path
Sahres
distribution
Fig. 1. Flow diagram of Source A
shares
solution of the 
linear system
reconstructed
secret
Fig. 2. Flow diagram of Destination B
Notice that any intruder eavesdropping up to 

 % shares from >  A 

9

has no information about the confidential
message sent over the network (according to Theorem 1).
IV. A POSSIBLE APPLICATION SCENARIO
This section provides a possible application scenario for the proposed hierarchical secret sharing scheme.
Let us assume to have an ad hoc network of  nodes uniformly distributed in a planar region of area  , for
example sensors disseminated in a terrain which need to communicate protecting data. In this situation, the problem
of finding independent paths between a pair of nodes has been addressed in several papers. In [6] a modified Dijkstra
algorithm is used; however, this solution assumes the knowledge of the graph associated with the network, which
is not always available in such a network. Different approaches are proposed, like [15] (Selective Broadcast) and
[16] (AODVM), just to quote some recent contributions. In particular, simulation results are available for F I
and   % I I I I 
 ([15],   VI) and for F 	 I 
	 I  I I and   	 I I    ([16],   IV).
Here instead we are going to determine a suitable choice of parameters for the implementation of our scheme
in this context, providing also a numerical example (see Table I). We denote by   
ﬃ
 the node spatial density
and by
ﬀ
the average distance between any pair of neighbouring nodes. As motivated in [17], II.A, the relationship
between  and
ﬀ
is approximately
ﬀ
 
 
 As a consequence, an estimate for number )  of hops in the shortest
path between two nodes
-
and $ having mutual distance

is given by  

, where  6

denotes the smallest
9integer 7 6 . An arbitrary path x between
-
and $ is a sequence of )   x  7 )  hops, and it is possible to split the
set 9 of independent paths between
-
and $ into levels as follows:


   x )   x   )  +
'
#

Moreover, if  is the probability for each node to be active, it is natural to set the packet loss probability increasing
with the number of hops:
 
  x  

% 

?   
"


In order to implement the proposed scheme, we introduce the integer:
'

 
0


	
'


 

:

:


 % 
 
  x  7 %



(5)
and we define a hierarchical structure based on length of paths:
9

  >







9
 
  >
 




Hence the set 9 naturally splits according to two priority levels into 9  , corresponding to paths with lower
number of hops and therefore lower probability of eavesdropping, intrusion and capturing, and 9   , collecting all
remaining ones. The discriminant number of hops is chosen as the minimum value compatible with the condition
that the threshold   defined in (4) is a positive integer. In this simplified scenario, we have  
    9      
#
and

 
  9
 
  

 
#
with I &   &    &% , but the proposed scheme gives the freedom to establish the path hierarchy
according to different parameters (for instance, high priority could be granted to paths with high performance: high
signal-to-noise ratio, low delay,...), as well as a combination of the above.
In Figure 3 we report a set of ﬀI nodes uniformly distributed in a %I I I  %I I I meters terrain. We find 
independent paths between the fixed source
-
and destination $ . The number of hops in the shortest path  
 is
equal to  , exactly as estimated above, and 
 sets of paths








are defined. Now it is possible to compute

A
+ + for each path and calculate '  by applying (5). The path hierarchy is now completely determined (see Table I).
In order to quantify the security enforcement produced by our hierarchical approach, we compare the probabilities
of reconstructing the secret after capturing
ﬀ
nodes in three different cases: Shamir’s standard scheme (where
just 
 nodes are needed among       ), Shamir’s hierarchical scheme (where  shares are assigned to paths





 and just one to paths      , so at least  shares, being expected to reach the destination, are requested
to recover the secret) and our hierarchical scheme (where at least  nodes are needed among    
  and at least

 among     

). We make the assumption that source - and destination $ cannot be captured. The remaining
 ﬁﬀﬃﬂ nodes, having the same probability of being captured, naturally split into ﬀ subsets,  corresponding to the
independent paths 


'
 %   (respectively with cardinalities        !  
 " #   

  ) and the
last are %$ collecting external nodes (with cardinality &$)           
  #  


  ). In this model, the
probability of getting
ﬀ

nodes from the set 

( '  %  ﬀ ) by capturing exactly ﬀ  ﬀ   + ﬀ  + ﬀ 
 + ﬀ  + ﬀ

+
ﬀ
$
nodes is given by the formula '
)(
$


 




*





*
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Hence, by adding the contributions of all relevant cases, we obtain the probability of reconstructing the secret
as a function of
ﬀ
as reported in Figure 4. It is apparent that Shamir’s hierarchical scheme is unsuitable for this
application, while our approach outperforms the standard non-hierarchical scheme. For instance, after capturing
%I  of nodes, the probability of secret reconstruction is 
   for our method against    for Shamir’s one.
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TABLE I
VALUES CORRESPONDING TO FIGURE 3
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The paper presents an innovative approach that exploits multi-path routes in order to define a flexible framework
for end-to-end secure transmission in ad hoc networks by distributing the shares in a hierarchical way. This is
achieved by designing an ideal, perfect, and eventually verifiable secret sharing scheme based on Birkhoff polynomial
interpolation and by establishing suitable hierarchies among independent paths. An explicit algorithm is provided
and a numerical example is presented in order to validate it.
Future work on the topic will deal with the implementation of the proposed scheme in a simulation environment.
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